Haiti Working Group

Key Perspectives

Key Perspectives: February 4, 2026

Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame

Haiti Working Group||||

Key Judgements

  • Need for True Haitian Solutions. Several participants suggested there was consistently too much reliance on outside entities and not enough reliance on Haitian actors ("waiting for the outsiders to decide," as one put it), especially in security and politics. Solutions should leave Haitians more in control of their own destiny. That said several Haitian participants acknowledged that outside actors intervene because of a consistent vacuum of leadership on the Haitian side.
  • Strong Opposition to PM Only Model. Participants agreed, based on their own extensive contacts in Haitian society, that there is a need to balance the power of the Prime Minister. They believe Haitians do not want to repeat the Henry years of singular and ineffective power. They were open to a broad range of options but agreed that leaving the PM as the sole power center was a bad idea.
  • Civil Society is Shut Out. Any structure should allow for extensive civil society participation, which currently has no clear way to contribute to governance and to influence government decision-making. There are various local and national dialogues in place that could be helpful to channel this.
  • U.S. Dominant Role Unavoidable but Problematic. The U.S. is the decider in chief for any political decisions and will remain so for the foreseeable future. But that singular concentration of power by an outside entity creates tension and should be exercised with care. There is a need for sustained U.S. support in a serious process of negotiation and discussion with Haitian political and civil society actors.
  • Good Governance is More Important than Who Governs. There is a crying need to simply improve governance; less "who" and more "what," as one participant put it.
  • Better a Good Election in 2027 than a Bad Election in 2026. There was widespread skepticism that elections can be held this year – security conditions will simply not allow for an election that meets even minimal standards and has any geographic breadth. Participants did not see an election that included a small percentage of the population as being either viable or recommendable.
  • Security First. Security is the "priority of all priorities" as one participant put it. All other issues rise and fall based on the establishment of baseline security across most of the country. Political decisions should be made primarily to support the re-establishment of security.
  • Mix of Skepticism and Hope on Gang Suppression Force. There was some skepticism about the Gang Suppression Force. Will it arrive in a timely fashion? Is it large enough? Does it have the right mix of forces? Is it functioning as part of a grand strategy ("the GSF is a force, not a plan," one participant noted). At the same time there was acknowledgement that there is a more substantive alignment of forces than at any time in the post assassination period.
  • Security is More than Just Force. Alongside the effort by the GSF and other forces to push back the gangs there will be a need to integrate the other elements of the security architecture – justice system, prisons, DDR – under a single plan to confront what is a sizable opposing force (as many as 10,000) gang members.
  • . . but the Forces are Too Small. The size of the Haitian security forces as planned is not at the scale needed for the task at hand. If the GSF succeeds in taking back neighborhoods from the gangs Haitian security forces as currently configured will be unable to fill in behind it.

Recommendations

  1. The U.S. should accept the widespread discomfort with a single executive and facilitate solutions that allow for the widest representation possible from Haitian civil society while providing a check on the power of a PM ruling alone. Optimally this would be some kind of a structured presidency but at a minimum an enforceable advisory council, or, as one participant put it, a “mini-parliament.”
  2. The U.S. should be cautious when using sanctions for political purposes, as opposed to corruption and violence, and even more cautious when using military threats for political purposes.
  3. The participants acknowledged the key role corruption plays in politics and security and urged stronger programs to root out corruption and ensure corrupt actors do not have access to government resources or decisions. Consideration should be made to restoring the Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ULCC)—Haiti’s anti-corruption agency— which has been hollowed out and politically co-opted.
  4. International actors should seek means to support improvements in day-to-day governance. There is a wide range of methods to achieve this but given the past year’s lack of progress it needs much more attention.
  5. Haitian civil society actors should build on the momentum of various efforts to provide oversight, recommendations, and communication to improve the government’s link to society. International actors should insist with the new government on broader civil society inclusion and should support the various efforts to develop structured national dialogues.
  6. A realistic electoral calendar should be developed that will allow for the necessary changes to election laws and the constitution and time for proper elections preparation.
  7. All involved Haitian and international entities should develop and adhere to (and publicize) a clear strategy for the restoration of security, with a focus on sizing the Haitian forces to the challenges at hand and building in them the enabling capacities currently planned and executed by foreign entities (e.g. intelligence, drones, and planning itself). A key component of this will be anti-corruption and vetting programs for police, army, and judicial officials.
  8. A concerted and immediate focus needs to be placed on the justice and prison systems so they are at capacity to work alongside the GSF and Haitian security forces as they capture gang members. One option is a previously planned “quick-build” prison with accompanying judicial facilities.
  9. An additional “surge” needs to be placed on DDR programs as the new force will put pressure on gangs (especially younger gang members), who could seek other options away from the gangs that currently do not exist. (One participant mentioned the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantling, and Reintegration that was halted in May 2025). Development of transitional justice mechanisms should be a key part of this.
  10. Continue to engage other key actors in the hemisphere. Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Argentina are all capable of doing more to help Haiti. They may be allergic to providing boots on the ground but could be enlisted to address other key needs.
  11. The U.S. should consider the impact of ending Temporary Protected Status on more than 300,000 Haitians living in the U.S. and the family members in Haiti who depend on their remittances. The U.S. should also consider the destabilizing consequences of sending migrants back to a country already struggling to meet the needs of some 1.4 million displaced persons.

Background

On February 4, 2026, the Haiti Working Group convened 45 experts at the Keough School of Global Affairs of the University of Notre Dame and virtually to assess the country’s governance transition and security situation and develop recommendations for international and Haitian leaders and policymakers. The meeting was organized under the previous auspices of the Global Fragility Act by Keith Mines (former USIP Vice President), Mary Speck (Inter-American Dialogue Senior Fellow, former USIP Senior Program Officer), Peter Hakim (President Emeritus and Senior Expert, Inter-American Dialogue), and Jeff Frazier (CEO, StimPack Strategies for Haiti).

Participants included a mix of Haitians and Americans including former U.S. and UN officials, civil society leaders, academic experts, representatives from binational and international development organizations, and policy analysts. Several participants joined remotely from Port-au-Prince, providing real-time perspective on conditions in Haiti. The meeting began with a readout of the work of the National Patriotic Congress.

The meeting followed Chatham House rules: insights and assessments were presented without individual attribution to encourage candor and allow for the sharing of broad conclusions.

Summary Readout

I. Governance Transition: The February 7 Moment

With the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate expiring February 7, participants achieved remarkable consensus on governance direction while acknowledging the complexity of Haiti’s political landscape.

Strong Opposition to Prime Minister-Only Model: Participants overwhelmingly rejected the idea of simply having Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé continue without broader governance reform. One participant noted that among Haitian political actors themselves, there is near-universal opposition (89-95%) to repeating the previous situation where one person holds both executive functions. The meeting consensus centered on legitimacy concerns: Fils-Aimé lacks both popular mandate and proven effectiveness, having failed to demonstrate capacity for independent action or coalition-building. One perspective characterized him as “just a face” selected by others, lacking the political standing to navigate Haiti’s crisis.

Governance Structure Debate: Participants were divided on alternatives. Some advocated for a smaller, more functional council (3 members rather than 9), arguing that the current TPC’s size creates dysfunction and enables corruption. The Montana Accord’s model of a two-person executive (President and Prime Minister) with a 21-member consultative commission received support as a framework that balances efficiency with representation.

A contrasting perspective challenged the focus on governance structure entirely. One participant argued that “governance what” matters far more than “governance who”—the working group cannot reach consensus on who should lead, and participants lack access to those negotiations. The critical question is what any leader will do with power: without concrete plans for security, justice, and economic recovery, any governance reform remains cosmetic. This perspective suggested focusing advocacy on actionable policies rather than personalities or structures.

U.S. Leverage and Influence: Participants questioned what tools the U.S. actually has to shape Haiti’s governance trajectory. Historical parallels to 1994 were raised—can the U.S. credibly threaten to withhold support or impose consequences? The consensus suggested U.S. influence has diminished considerably, particularly given reluctance to commit resources or troops. Several noted that the U.S. “prevents options without supporting alternatives,” creating what one termed “the worst possible outcome.”

Post-meeting development: Hours after the meeting concluded, the U.S. publicly affirmed support for PM Fils-Aimé continuing beyond February 7, effectively rejecting TPC restructuring proposals. This intervention demonstrates continued U.S. influence while validating participants’ concerns about preventing alternatives without offering comprehensive solutions.

Civil Society Inclusion: Multiple participants stressed that any legitimate governance transition must include meaningful civil society participation. The current process excludes the Haitian population from negotiations, undermining legitimacy regardless of which structural model emerges.

II. Security Realities: The Gang Suppression Force

Participants offered detailed assessments of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission and Gang Suppression Force (GSF), revealing significant gaps between stated goals and operational realities.

GSF Capabilities and Limitations: Participants acknowledged the new GSF would be larger than the MSS it is augmenting but even at larger numbers (5,500 vs. 1,000) still questioned whether its geographic reach would extend much beyond Port-au-Prince, with minimal presence in areas like Artibonite (Haiti’s breadbasket, now controlled by Gran Grif gang).

Participants urged focus on equipment and logistics and on the intelligence capabilities, air support, and specialized training needed for urban countergang operations. Participants noted that even when gang members are arrested, Haiti’s collapsed judicial system and destroyed prisons mean there’s nowhere to hold them—arrested individuals are often released within hours.

Funding Debate: Participants were divided on GSF financial sustainability. Some expressed confidence that Canada, Germany, and France are stepping up. Others noted the gap between commitments and disbursements has historically plagued Haiti interventions, with tremendous uncertainty about whether pledges will materialize on needed timelines.

Missing Components: Participants emphasized that military/police action alone cannot address Haiti’s security crisis. The MSS mission lacks DDR programs for gang members, prison construction, justice system reform, and economic alternatives for gang-dominated communities. One participant described decades of international engagement as focusing on “preventing bad things from happening” rather than creating conditions for positive development—a reactive approach that avoids the institutional capacity-building investments needed for sustainable security.

U.S. Military Posture: The deployment of a U.S. Navy destroyer and Coast Guard cutters signals readiness for expanded involvement if conditions deteriorate dramatically, though participants noted the U.S. focus remains narrowly on preventing complete state collapse rather than building sustainable security institutions. Confirmation: Three U.S. naval vessels deployed to Port-au-Prince bay under “Operation Southern Spear” as of February 4, positioning forces for potential evacuation or intervention.

III. Humanitarian-Security Nexus

Food Insecurity as Violence Driver: WFP presented data showing that among 2 million Haitians in emergency food insecurity, 10% report using illegal means to survive—a direct pipeline to gang recruitment. Participants emphasized that security interventions divorced from humanitarian realities cannot succeed. Without economic alternatives, young men will continue joining gangs as the only viable income source.

Humanitarian Access Crisis: Aid delivery faces gang “taxation” of convoys, making operations dangerous and expensive. Port-au-Prince’s port remains partially gang-controlled.

IV. Justice and Accountability

Participants identified Haiti’s collapsed justice system as a critical gap undermining all other interventions.

Anti-Corruption Mechanisms: The Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ULCC)—Haiti’s anti-corruption agency—has been hollowed out and politically co-opted. Sanctions programs, intended to target corrupt elites and gang financiers, have been weaponized for political purposes rather than genuinely addressing illicit networks. Several participants called for reviving independent anti-corruption institutions, potentially with international oversight or an international tribunal for major crimes.

Vetting and Accountability: Creating new security or governance institutions requires vetting processes to exclude compromised officials, gang collaborators, and human rights violators. However, Haiti currently lacks functioning institutions to conduct such vetting. International support for justice sector reform must be comprehensive—courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, prisons, and police all need simultaneous rebuilding.

V. International Context and Coordination

Participants examined Haiti’s crisis within broader geopolitical and regional dynamics.

Regional Engagement: Questions arose about why regional powers—Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina—have largely stayed on the sidelines despite CARICOM’s prominence in the MSS mission. Historical trauma from previous peacekeeping missions (particularly Brazil’s MINUSTAH role) creates reluctance, but participants argued that sustainable solutions require Western Hemisphere ownership rather than dependence on Kenya.

Temporary Protected Status (TPS): With potential changes to U.S. immigration policy, participants raised concerns about Haitian deportations. Removing TPS or deporting Haitians would flood a collapsed state with returnees who have no economic opportunities, potentially fueling gang recruitment. The remittances from Haitian diaspora in the U.S. provide critical economic support—disrupting this flow would worsen the crisis.

Donor Coordination: While pledges from Canada, Germany, France, and others offer hope for sustained MSS funding, participants noted that donor coordination in Haiti has historically been poor. Competing priorities, bureaucratic delays, and lack of unified strategy have undermined previous interventions. Success requires not just funding commitments but coordinated disbursement and implementation.

VI. The Long Game

Even with optimal policy and resources, Haiti’s recovery will take years, likely decades. Gang entrenchment, institutional collapse, and economic destruction have created a multi-generational crisis requiring realistic expectations about timelines and complexity. Ultimately, external actors cannot impose solutions—any successful path requires Haitian civil society and population to drive the process, with international support enabling rather than substituting for Haitian-led recovery.