Haiti Working Group Meeting on Humanitarian Issues

Background

On March 12, 2026, 30 members of the Haiti Working Group convened virtually to assess humanitarian conditions in Haiti as anti-gang operations enter a more forceful phase. The meeting was anchored by a briefing from William O’Neill, the UN designated expert on human rights in Haiti, who recently returned from a 10-day trip to Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien. Participants then discussed the country’s urgent humanitarian needs: displacement, civilian harm, hunger and lack of basic services, and youth reintegration.

The meeting was organized and moderated by the working group co-chairs: Keith Mines and Mary Speck (former USIP), Peter Hakim (IAD Emeritus), and Jeff Frazier (Stimpack-Strategies for Haiti), and supported by the Keough School of Global Affairs of the University of Notre Dame. The meeting followed Chatham House principles: assessments aside from the opening briefing were presented without individual attribution to encourage candor and allow for the sharing of broad conclusions.

I. Fragile Security Gains

O’Neill noted that Haitians were feeling “more secure” than they had when he visited a year ago. There was a sense that the security was “starting to turn,” though he stressed there was still “a long way to go.” The police and private security forces have been able to clear and hold, at least for now, some territory. Some gang leaders seem to have gone into hiding or left Port au Prince, leaving their younger fighters behind.

People are starting to return to retaken neighborhoods, but some are going back to a “scorched earth scenario,” where gangs have destroyed houses and taken whatever they could.

But O’Neill noted that the humanitarian situation remains “catastrophic.” More than 1.4 million people are still displaced; access to healthcare, education, clean water is limited; and gangs retain control over movement, commerce, and daily life in many communities.

II. Humanitarian Conditions and Civilian Risk

O’Neill cited estimates of more than 1.4 million displaced Haitians, many of whom are living in public parks, schools and churches. He said this number likely underestimated the total number of displaced people, since it did not include those who have moved in with family members or simply melded into other communities.

Conditions in the makeshift sites used to house the displaced were described as unhealthy and insecure. O’Neill mentioned a site with one toilet for 1,000 people and a dripping pipe for bathing. Access to food is irregular. Girls and young women are extremely vulnerable to sexual violence.

A major concern was that more forceful anti-gang operations could worsen the humanitarian picture. Participants pressed for contingency planning for additional displacement, civilian injuries, and emergency service delivery in neighborhoods that may become the focus of intensified anti-gang operations.

III. The “Day After” and Youth Reintegration

Discussion focused on urgent “day after” problems: What happens to minors, coerced recruits, and communities emerging from gang rule if the GSF and Haitian authorities succeed in degrading gang control?

Many low-level gang members are simultaneously perpetrators and victims, recruited through coercion, hunger, intimidation, and survival incentives. Gangs exert tight control over neighborhoods, subjecting anyone entering or exiting to tolls if they cross the “border” from one gang territory to another. Residents from these neighborhoods are also stigmatized by other Haitians, who regard anyone from certain neighborhoods as potentially “dangerous.”

Participants argued for immediate planning around reintegration, literacy, vocational training, psychosocial care, violence reduction, and broader youth pathways extending beyond former gang members to neglected youth more generally.

More than two-thirds of the country’s population is under 24 years old. Youth-led protests in 2018, some of which turned violent, helped usher in Haiti’s current political crisis.

Several participants supported some form of youth corps to provide young Haitians with steady incomes, structure, and a stake in reconstruction. The Haitian constitution already includes a mandatory civic service requirement.

Haiti’s small but growing army is another potential “social elevator” for young people seeking skills and education.

IV. Justice, Prisons, and Corruption

Corruption, impunity, non-functioning courts, and lack of adequate prisons were discussed as obstacles to long-term stability. Haiti has not had a functioning justice system in years, creating an enormous backlog.

O’Neill mentioned overcrowding in a Haitian prison he visited, with 50 to 60 people in a cell that is meant to hold only 10. More than 80 percent of the prisoners there were still awaiting trial. He also visited a courthouse, which sat empty, without any judges or lawyers available to arraign prisoners or conduct trials.

There are plans for private companies to build three new prisons, despite controversy over the allegedly corrupt (“infamous”) contracting process. There are also reportedly plans to build a temporary, modular holding facility near the U.S. embassy where lower ranking gang members could be held up to a maximum of 72 hours before they would be handed over to the HNP/Justice system. High value leaders arrested are most likely going to be extradited almost immediately to the U.S. But these were understood as partial fixes rather than a justice strategy.

To break the judicial “logjam,” Haiti is creating two specialized courts. These courts will be “wholly Haitian,” with some help and support from international experts. One will focus on mass gang-related crimes, including sexual abuse, and the other on corruption.

A specialized anti-corruption unit (Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption or ULCC) has referred more than 100 well-documented cases involving high-level businesspeople and politicians to the justice system. But then the cases get stuck. Only one has reportedly been prosecuted.

V. Trauma, Mental Health, and Social Repair

Haitian health practitioners and peacebuilding actors described severe depression, accumulated social trauma, and the risk of multigenerational psychological damage.

Participants argued that trauma healing needs to be included in recovery planning, especially for youth, communities emerging from gang control, survivors of sexual violence, and frontline service providers. If Haiti cannot address trauma, the country is likely to reproduce cycles of violence.

VI. The State Must Follow Security Operations

Keith Mines steered the final part of the meeting toward recommendations.

Participants stressed the need to support locally led efforts to restore security. A participant mentioned keeping a local health clinic open by pooling resources with other nonprofits to hire a private security or “vigilante” force. “You could say that’s another gang,” he said, “but these are individuals who have family and homes in the community.”

Another relief expert stressed the need to support locally led humanitarian aid systems. “They are always the first responders because they know the local power dynamics best.” Despite their crucial humanitarian role, he added, these local systems are chronically “underinvested.”

A doctor mentioned the need to identify, cultivate and train the right people. “They exist. We have some 500 staff. All are Haitian with an unbelievable ethic. Respect for rules, norms and ethics are key.” The doctor stressed that security forces need to be held to the same standard. They need to invest in better intelligence and vetting to prevent infiltration by gangs and other corrupt actors.

VII. Leadership, Elections, and the Limits of Technical Fixes

Even though the meeting’s formal subject was humanitarian relief, the discussion repeatedly circled back to political leadership, corruption and resources. Participants worried that corrupt actors, linked to the political parties, were in charge of government ministries signing long-term contracts worth tens of millions of dollars.

Others wondered whether there would be the resources needed to disarm, dismantle gangs and reintegrate them into Haitian communities.

Participants agreed that elections were not going to happen during this calendar year. Insecurity plus unresolved voter registration issues would make it impossible to organize credible elections. Under these conditions, holding elections would risk repeating Haiti’s history of contested, violent election processes.

VIII. Bottom Line

Security in Haiti is improving even before the full deployment of the Gang Suppression Force. The Haitian National Police, backed by private security firms, have managed to clear and hold some gang-dominated neighborhoods. But these gains are fragile and reversable.

Security operations must be accompanied by urgent action to address the country’s humanitarian crisis, including basic service delivery, a functioning justice system, youth reintegration, mental health services and support for the local actors who understand community dynamics.

Document prepared March 2026 for circulation among working group organizations, international organization leadership, U.S. policy community, and congressional staff.